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Social Responsibility in European
Company Law
By CLIVE M. SCHMITTHOFF*
The Era of Regulated Capitalism
In the Western countries of market economy the economic system
of capitalism is in a transitional stage. Capitalism at the end of the
twentieth century is very different from capitalism at the end of the
nineteenth century. The idea of laisser-aller has now been widely dis-
carded, although some still think that all is best if the economic world
is left to its own laws and the survival of the fittest is the accepted rule.
At the end of the twentieth century it has been realized that, although
the system of economic liberalism as a form of the capitalist system
provided great wealth and prosperity down to the upper strata of the
middle classes, it also created great social injustice and poverty so op-
pressive as to keep those near the starvation line from rising above the
station of life into which they were born.
When it is realized that the nineteenth century system of economic
liberalism which continued to the end of the First World War is gone
and we are now in a transitional period, the question arises as to where
that transition will lead. Some economists and sociologists think that
capitalism is in its last stage and, as predicted by Karl Marx, after dy-
ing a slow and painful death, will give place to the millenium of social-
ism. Other modern thinkers take a different view. They point to the
fact that economic and social life in the countries that adopted the sys-
tem of socialism after the First World War have not done too well
under it. In terms of human happiness, personal freedom and even
economic progress, those countries have not, to an impartial and unbi-
ased observer, created the conditions of advance that are commensu-
rate with the progress in the countries of market economy, even if one
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takes into account the social and economic backwardness of some of
these countries that existed when they embarked on the new economic
system. The socialists made grievous and costly mistakes in the central
planning of the economy, although many planners have learned by
their mistakes. Freedom of thought and movement of persons across
frontiers into Western economies is still strictly regimented in many of
these countries, obviously because a comparison with the situation pre-
vailing in the market economy countries is not welcome. Therefore,
that Western countries will move from liberal capitalism into an era of
socialism is not a well-founded conclusion.
What then is the era into which the relinquished system of liberal
capitalism is now moving in the Western world? It is, as far as the
development in the Western countries of Europe indicates, a system of
regulated capitalism or, in other words, a period of social responsibil-
ity. It is a function of the state to see that social justice is done, that the
weaker groups of the population are given the protection of the state,
and that the state machinery is used to prevent their exploitation by
unscrupulous excesses of unbridled capitalism. The weaker groups of
the population which require protection include the consumers, who
have been found to be helpless when faced with powerful, concen-
trated, trans-national or national enterprises, the employees, who might
become defenseless pawns in the economic and political power game
when exposed to redundancy and social insecurity, the investors, whose
savings are endangered by unscrupulous speculators who, for instance,
did not prevent the Great Crash in the United States in 1929, and the
population at large, which is deprived of the ecological enjoyment of
their environment when encountering the ravages of a science, which
thinks only in terms of technological progress. That the state functions
to protect these weaker groups of the population is now generally rec-
ognized. This recognition has given rise to new branches of law. A law
of consumer protection has become an integral part of our legal order.
The law of employee protection has been developed not only by al-
lowing trade unions an enhanced status but by devising legal protection
against unfair dismissal, length of notice of termination of the contract
of employment, and compensation for loss of work. Investors are pro-
tected by regulations administered by such institutions as the Securities
and Exchange Commission in the United States, the Panel on Take-
overs and Mergers in the United Kingdom, the Commission des
Ok'erations de Bourse in France and a general strengthening of the pro-
tection provisions of company and securities law. The environment is
protected by planning and zoning legislation. Looked at from a wider
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perspective, we have entered into a new era of capitalism, namely that
of regulated capitalism.
As far as Europe is concerned, this is no longer a matter of party
political differences. This view is indeed accepted by all parties in the
Western countries. It allows, however, a wider inference. The period
of liberal capitalism appears to be followed by a period of regulated
capitalism or, if one wants to express it differently, of social responsibil-
ity. This economic system has great advantages when compared with
the socialist system adopted by the countries of state-planned economy,
except perhaps the Yugoslav system which appears to combine a social-
ist form with principles of regulated capitalism. The economy of regu-
lated capitalism admits the personal liberties cherished in the Western
tradition, freedom of thought and personal freedom and prevents, at
the same time, the worst excesses of unbridled capitalism. In many
European countries it finds expression in the adoption of the mixed
economy in which a public and private sector of the economy work side
by side. This system is founded on the regulation of the private sector
by the state. Here, of course, differences between economists and poli-
ticians arise. Some are in favour of little interference by the state with
the private sector; some consider it necessary for the state to exercise a
stricter control. We are not concerned here with these differences. Suf-
fice it to say that there is general agreement that in the era of regulated
capitalism it is a function of the state to exercise some degree of control
over the.private sector.
The Interests Involved in the Company
The development of regulated capitalism has greatly affected com-
pany law philosophy. The company is the typical form of private en-
terprise in all Western countries. However, in the era of regulated
capitalism the company is no longer regarded as an instrument of profit
maximization in the sole interest of the shareholders. The general view
is that the interests of the employees and the public at large have like-
wise to be taken into account. The shareholders are the providers of
the capital that the company requires for the successful carrying on of
its business. It is uncontested that the company should work profitably;
the importance of the profit motive has been in no way impaired. Even
the best schemes of employee participation or profit sharing will not
work when the company operates at a loss. But the interest of the
shareholders, as we shall see, is no longer the sole determinant in the
management of the company. The employees who often give their life-
time for their work in the company have an interest that equals that of
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the shareholders. The public at large is likewise interested in the con-
duct of the company. Not only has the company to think of its public
image, but essentially the company is just one unit in the national body
politic. Company law has thus changed its character. It has developed
from company law (droit des socitbs ) to a law of enterprises (droit des
entreprises).
This transition means that the function of the management in the
modem company has changed. The aim of the management is no
longer to obtain the maximum profit for the shareholders of the com-
pany, distributable by way of dividends, by its operations, irrespective
of the interests of the employees and society at large. The function of
the management is nowadays that of balancing all relevant interests,
namely those of the shareholders who rightly demand an adequate re-
turn on their investments, of the employees who rightly demand just
wages and job security, and of the public at large which requires that
the affairs of the company are conducted in the wider context of the
national interest.
That balancing function of modem management is essentially a
function of social engineering. It is comparable to the function of mod-
em government which aims at finding a compromise between the con-
flicting interests of pressure groups in the community. Consciously or
unconsciously, most managements of large companies are aware of this
position and fulfill this function well.
One of the curious aspects of the present situation is that although
modem company-law philosophy is widely accepted in the system of
regulated capitalism, the company laws of most Western countries do
not give expression to it but are still framed in terms of economic liber-
alism. The Western European countries have, however, found it neces-
sary to graft rules expressing modem company-law philosophy on the
body of the liberalistic concept of the company. Some of these meas-
ures of European regulation will be examined in the following, but it
may already be observed here that, as far as the Member States of the
European Economic Community are concerned, ideas emanating from
that organization have been very influential. These developments will
be examined separately for the directors, the shareholders, the employ-
ees, and the public interest. But before this examination can be carried
out, it is necessary to consider the classification of companies as such.
A New Classification of Companies
The traditional classification of companies in Europe is into public
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and private companies. The private company originated in Germany
as the GeselIschaft mit beschrdnkter faftung (GmbH), where it is still
regulated by the Law of April 20, 1892. This Law is at present under
revision. Professor H. Wurdinger writes in his German Company Law:
"The private company ... is an invention of the legislature, and was
created by the Law of 20th April, 1892 (GmbHG) without any histori-
cal precedent in German or European law."' The idea of the private
company was to make the form of the limited-liability company avail-
able to small business. This idea spread from Germany to France and
the other European countries. The private company was introduced
into French law by the Law of March 7, 1925 which admitted the crea-
tion of the soci6t a responsabilitk limite (SARL). In Belgium this form
is known as the socit& despersonnes'a responsabilitb limite (SPRL). In
the United Kingdom the private company was introduced by the Com-
pany Law Reform of 1907 and 1908.2
The traditional distinction between public and private companies
is no longer in accordance with economic reality. The private company
is used for two different purposes, as the small family company and as
a subsidiary of large enterprises, particularly of the public-company
type. The United Kingdom Companies Act 1948 sought to distinguish
between these two types of the private company. The Act attempted to
grant the privilege of balance-sheet secrecy to small private companies
owned by individuals, called exempt private companies, but it withheld
the principle of balance-sheet secrecy from subsidiary private compa-
nies, the shares of which were owned by other companies. This ar-
rangement proved to be too complicated, and, since the Companies Act
1967, all private companies in the United Kingdom, large or small,
have had to publish their balance sheets. However, it is now widely
recognized in the United Kingdom that that measure went too far and
that small family companies require special regulation. In the leading
case of In re Westbourne Galleries Limited 3 the House of Lords recog-
nized that the so-called partnership company4 enjoyed a special status
and that the shareholders in such a company were under an equitable
obligation not to exercise their legal rights in a manner contravening
the expectations of the other members.
The modem classification of companies that is closer to economic
1. H. WORDINGER, GERMAN COMPANY LAW 183 (1975).
2. I PALMER, COMPANY LAW, T 2-09 (2d ed. 1976).
3. [1973] A.C. 360; see Bushell v. Faith, [1970] A.C. 1099; Schmitthoff, How the Eng-
lish Discovered the Private Company, in Quo VADIS IUS SOCIETATUM? 183 (1972).
4. See generally Morse & Tedd, Partnershio Companies, 1971 J. Bus. L. 261.
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reality is that between large public companies listed at the Stock Ex-
change and family companies which use the corporate form only for
purposes of convenience, such as to avail themselves of the benefit of
limited liability or for tax reasons. Between these two poles of large
listed public companies and small family companies is a spectrum of
large private companies and unlisted public companies. The concept of
the large company5 is recognized in many European countries, al-
though no unanimity exists on what constitutes a large company. Thus,
in Germany, where the GmbH in principle enjoys balance-sheet se-
crecy, following the United Kingdom Companies Act 1967, the so-cal-
led Publizitdtsgesetz of 1969 was introduced which lays down three
criteria for the GmbH:
(a) the total balance of the annual balance sheet exceeds DM
125,000,000;
(b) the turnover in the last twelve months exceeds DM 250,000,000;
(c) the enterprise has employed more than 5,000 employees during
the last twelve months.
If two of these criteria are satisfied, the GmbH must publish its balance
sheet, like the public company (Aktiengesellschaft, A.G.). Sometimes
different criteria are employed for the large company with respect to
balance-sheet secrecy and the requirement of employee participation.
Thus in Germany a GmbH must have a supervisory board and em-
ployee participation if it has more than 500 employees. In the Nether-
lands every company, whether public or private, must publish its
balance sheet if it satisfies the following three cumulative criteria:
(a) according to its balance sheet the issued capital and the reserves
amount to at least D.Fl. 10,000,000;
(b) the company or any other company in which it holds at least
half of the issued shares for its own benefit is compelled by law
to establish a works council; and
(c) the company or any such other company usually employs at
least 100 employees in the Netherlands.
In Denmark, according to an Act of June 13, 1973, a company must
have a supervisory board with employee participation if it has more
than fifty employees and the employees so desire. According to the
Fifth Draft Directive of the EEC, which deals with company structure
and applies only to public companies, all these companies must have a
supervisory board but employee participation is on principle only pro-
vided for companies having 500 or more employees.
It would be desirable if in the course of time a uniform concept of
the large company could be established in the EEC for the purposes of
5. See generally Schmitthoff, New Concepts in Company Law, 1973 J. Bus. L. 312.
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publicity and employee participation, but at present there is no indica-
tion for a development in that direction.
In the United Kingdom an interesting change in attitude is notice-
able which is necessary in order to comply with the Second Council
Directive of the EEC of December 13, 1976. So far the public company
was the residual form in the United Kingdom and every company that
was not a private company was treated as a public company. In com-
pliance with the Second Council Directive, however, a change will be
carried out that is already indicated in the Government White Paper on
Changes in Company Law.6 Every company will henceforth be a pri-
vate company unless it satisfies the requirements for a public company
which include, inter alia, a minimum capital of £50,000. If that sugges-
tion is accepted by Parliament, the private company will be the residual
form of company.
The following observations will be restricted to the large public
company listed at the Stock Exchange.
The Directors
The change in company law philosophy towards social responsi-
bility has led to three changes in the position of directors.
First, in the large public company the managerial mentality has
changed. As already indicated, the directors no longer consider them-
selves as acting solely in the interest of the shareholders; their function
is to balance all interests represented in the company. It is, of course, a
myth that the structure of the company ever constituted a shareholders'
democracy. Even legally shareholders do not have that power. The
United Kingdom Companies Act 1948, Sched. 1, Table A, Art. 80,
makes it quite clear that the directors shall have residual power to man-
age all business of the company and exercise all such powers as are not
required to be exercised by the general meeting. In practice, the man-
agement of the large listed company is self-perpetuating.
Second, it has become clear in modern company administration
that the managerial function is divided. This function consists of the
planning of long term strategy of the company and the day to day man-
agement of its affairs. This division in the function of the directorate is
noticeable in most countries of the Western world. In the United
States, for instance, in many companies the directors exercise the plan-
ning function and have delegated the ordinary management of affairs
to managers who are accountable to them. This division in the mana-
6. CMND. No. 7291 (1978).
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gerial function is the reason why the German invention of a two-tier
board divided into a supervisory or policy board (Aufsichtsrat) and
managing board (Vorstand) has found much attention in modem Euro-
pean company law.
Originally that dualist system was devised in Germany because the
banks that provided the capital for the company wanted to maintain
control over the use of the capital. Later it was found that that board
structure best fitted the division of the managerial function. For that
reason the French loi sur la socits of 1966 gave public companies in
France the option either to retain the traditional single board system
(administrateurs) or to introduce the two-tier system (conseil de
surveillance and directoire). The Dutch company-law reform of 1971
and the Danish reform of 1973 have likewise adopted the two-tier sys-
tem for large companies. The EEC in its various proposals, particu-
larly in the Discussion Paper on Employee Participation and Company
Structure7 and in the final draft of the Statute for European Compa-
nies,8 likewise favours the two-tier board system.
In the United Kingdom there is considerable controversy whether
large listed public companies should have a single board system includ-
ing a number of nonexecutive directors, or a two-tier board system.
The Government White Paper on Industrial Defiocracy,9 following the
French example, suggests that companies having 2,000 or more em-
ployees shall have the option of adopting the single or two-tier board
system. In practice there is not a great difference between a single
board with a number of nonexecutive directors and the two-tier board
system, apart from the fact that under the latter the members of the
managing board are appointed by the supervisory board and not the
shareholders. The British proposal, however, is different from the Ger-
man proposal-and in that respect similar to the Danish law-in that
the same person may be a member of both boards.
Third, the changed mentality in the attitude of directors of public
companies that was noted before is finding expression in certain legal
requirements. It is proposed in the United Kingdom that insider trad-
ing shall be made a criminal offense and it is intended to lay down in
the next companies' statute that a director owes a duty of utmost good
faith to the company. The latter provision would not introduce a new
principle into English law as these rules have already been developed
7. BULL. OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (Supp. 8/75).
8. BULL. OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (Supp. 4/75).
9. CMND. No. 7231 (1978).
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by the English courts.' 0
These changes in the managerial attitude, the board structures and
legal regulations reflect the changes of company law philosophy in the
era of regulated capitalism.
The Shareholders
The first problem that arises with respect to shareholders is that
the minority shareholder requires protection against unscrupulous and
selfish exploitation by the majority. The English Companies Act 1948,
s. 210, attempted to solve this problem by giving the minority share-
holder relief if the affairs of the company were conducted in an oppres-
sive manner and a petition for winding up under the just and equitable
clause (s. 222(f)) would unfairly prejudice the minority shareholder.
This remedy proved to be insufficient and unsatisfactory. The legal re-
quirements for its availability were too strict. For that reason the Jen-
kins Report of 196211 made certain suggestions for relaxation of these
legal requirements and the Companies Bill proposed in the Govern-
ment White Paper on Changes in Company Law 12 has taken up these
suggestions. The Bill proposes that relief shall be available if the affairs
of the company are conducted in a manner "unfairly prejudicial,"
changed from "oppressive," to the interests of the petitioner, and that
such relief shall be no longer alternative to a winding up petition. As in
the present law, relief will be available on the petition of a single share-
holder or several shareholders.
The attitude of social responsibility indicated by the proposal to
extend the protection of the minority against unscrupulous use of the
majority position can likewise be detected in the attitude of the English
courts when considering the question whether a shareholder may make
use of his voting power solely in his own financial interest, without
regard to the interests of the other shareholders. This question arose in
particular in Clemens v. Clemens Bros. Ltd.13 In that case the minority
shareholder held more than twenty-five percent of the voting capital.
She could therefore prevent the passing of a special resolution which
required a three-fourths majority. The majority shareholder issued
new shares, which could be done by the ordinary majority she pos-
10. Industrial Development Consultants Ltd. v. Cooley, [1972] 1 W.L.R. 443 (Binmning-
ham Assize 1971); see Schmitthoff, The Position of Directors in the Modern Business
Corporation, 15 U.W. ONTARIO L. REV. 179 (1976).
11. CMND. No. 1749 (1962).
12. CMND. No. 7291 (1978).
13. Clemens v. Clemens Bros. Ltd., [1976] 2 All E.R. 268 (Ch.).
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sessed, and thereby diluted the share capital so that the participation of
the minority shareholder sank below twenty-five percent. The minority
shareholder thus lost what has been called negative control. The court
set aside the resolution increasing the capital on equitable grounds,
thus preventing the majority shareholder from exercising her legal
rights in the interest of her own financial advantage. The case, un-
doubtedly correctly decided, has caused much discussion in the United
Kingdom.
From the viewpoint of social responsibility, however, another as-
pect of the position of the shareholder is more important than that of
the protection of the minority shareholder. Although in legal theory
the shareholders are the owners of the company, this is a myth as far as
reality is concerned, at least in the large listed companies. In terms of
economic reality, the shareholders do not have a proprietary interest in
the company, but a financial one. They are not owners but investors.
They have invested their money in the company because they hope for
an adequate return on their investment and a participation in the
growth prospects of the company in which they have invested. That
means that the law has to provide protection for shareholders as inves-
tors. A financial collapse such as happened in the twenties and thirties
would endanger the public image of the economic system of capitalism,
even in its regulated form. But quite apart therefrom, in the United
States and in the United Kingdom diverse strata of the population have
invested in equity holdings, either directly as small investors, or indi-
rectly through pension funds and insurance companies. Their savings
must be protected.
In no country is the protection of the investor as well developed as
in the United States. The Securities and Exchange Commission enjoys
the highest reputation and has served as a model for similar institu-
tions, particularly in Canada. In the United Kingdom another system
has been adopted. The regulation of the securities industry, is not car-
ried out solely on the basis of statutory regulation. It is a mixed system,
partly founded on statute, 14 but mostly on voluntary self-regulation
contained in the Rules of the Stock Exchange and the City Code on
Take-overs and Mergers. These measures of self-regulation are not en-
forced by law; all that the Take-over Panel can do is administer private
or public reprimands or impose fines, but its authority is rarely chal-
lenged. The first steps for the voluntary self-control of take-overs and
14. Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act, 1958, c.45; Licensed Dealers (Conduct of
Business) Rules 1960 (issued under the Prevention of Frauds (Investments) Act).
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mergers were taken in 1959. The system has thus been in existence for
almost twenty years. The surprising thing is that it works, which is due
to the fact that those connected with issues, take-overs, and mergers are
a relatively small group, almost a club. But it is thought that the system
of voluntary self-control will not work forever. Voluntary self-control
will have to be supported by fall back legislation providing statutory
coercion, but the United Kingdom will try to avoid setting up a bureau-
cratic machinery comparable to the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
That the measures of investor protection operate to avoid fraud
against the investor goes without saying. Here the laws of the United
States and of the United Kingdom provide, it is thought, adequate pro-
tection, although, as the I.O.S. affair has shown, those of some Euro-
pean continental countries would admit improvement. The danger to
the investor is today not fraud but discrimination. The danger is that
large investors are paid more for their shares in the case of a take-over
than small investors. In some European countries this practice is re-
garded as justified; one talks of an extra payment for the control pre-
mium. In the United Kingdom the idea of the control premium is
rejected. It is thought that on take-over all shareholders shall receive
the same price. General Principle No. 8 of the United Kingdom Take-
over Code states---"all shareholders of the same class of an offeree
company shall be treated similarly by the offeror." If a bidder acquires
thirty percent or more of the voting shares at the Stock Exchange, he
has to make a bid for all remaining shares at the highest price he has
paid for any stock acquired during the past year. These measures of
investor protection clearly express the sense of social responsibility felt
by financial circles and government departments charged with protect-
ing the small investor.
The Employees
In no area has the principle of social responsibility found stronger
expression than in that of employee participation in the determination
of the affairs of the company. The country most advanced in this field
is Germany. In the larger companies there exist works councils, eco-
nomic committees, and co-determination of employees on the supervi-
sory board. Since 1976, three systems of co-determination have existed
in Germany. In public companies employing 2,000 or fewer employees
the supervisory board consists of two-thirds of shareholders and of one-
third of employees. In companies employing more than 2,000 employ-
ees the law provides for parity of shareholders and employees on the
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supervisory board, but the chairman must always be a shareholder and
the managing employees are represented on the employees' side. In the
Montan industry (coal, iron, steel) there is likewise parity on the super-
visory board, but under an independent chairman. The strong partici-
pation and co-determination by employees in Germany has
undoubtedly contributed to the fairly peaceful labour relations existing
in that country.
The German system of works councils below board level has been
imitated by many other countries in Europe. It has also become the
model for EEC proposals. Further, the Dutch company law reform of
1971 prescribes a supervisory board for large companies but adopts the
principle of co-optation; in other words, if there is a vacancy on the
supervisory board, it shall be filled by co-option, the shareholders and
the employees having a right of veto. If that veto is exercised, a com-
mittee of the Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands shall
decide whether it has been exercised for good reason. The system has
been in operation since 1973; it appears to work well and on only one
occasion has the veto been exercised by one of the groups in a Nether-
lands company. The Dutch model is sometimes referred to as the har-
mony model and is contrasted with the German confrontation model.
In the United Kingdom, the Government published in 1978 a
White Paper on Industrial Democracy.' 5 Its leading principles are that
there should be a voluntary agreement between companies and trade
unions on the formation of so-called joint representation committees
which compare with the German works councils. If no agreement can
be reached, there should be a statutory fall back right of the trade un-
ions to demand the formation of such a committee. The White Paper
provides that only trade union labour shall vote for the joint represen-
tation committee but that provision is hotly contested. Two or three
years after the constitution of such a joint representation committee,
the employees in companies employing 2,000 or more employees in the
United Kingdom may demand co-determination on the board which
may be either a single board or a two-tier board (in which case co-
determination would take place on the supervisory board) and here the
relationship would be two-thirds of the members of the board to be
appointed by the shareholders and one-third by the employees. In
other words, the White Paper suggests the adoption of the old German
system, at least for the time being.
To sum up, in all member states of the EEC the principle is recog-
15. CMND. No. 7231 (1978).
[Vol. 30
nized that employees shall have a say in the determination of the affairs
of the company. This principle is also recognized in non-EEC coun-
tries, such as Sweden and Norway, but the realization of this principle
has not proceeded unanimously. It is most strongly expressed in Ger-
many and most weakly in France and Italy. The principle is strongly
advanced by the EEC and much discussed in the United Kingdom.
The Public Interest
That the public interest requires employee representation in the
company is widely recognized. Three illustrations may be given. First,
the final draft of the Statute for European Companies published by the
Commission of the European Communities on May 13, 197516 provides
that the supervisory board shall consist of one-third appointed by the
shareholders, one-third appointed by the employees and the final third
co-opted by these two groups. As regards the members of the third
group, Article 75(3) of the final draft of the Statute provides:
Only persons representing general interests, possessing the necessary
knowledge and experience, and not directly dependent on the share-
holders, the employees or their respective organizations may be
nominated.
Second, according to Dutch law, as explained by Professor Pieter Sand-
ers, the following persons may not be members of the supervisory
board:
Persons in the employment of the company; persons in the employ-
ment of another company in which the company holds directly or
indirectly at least half of the issued share capital for its own benefit;
senior officers and persons in the employment of an employees' or-
ganization which is usually a party to collective bargaining agree-
ments with the company. The purpose of this provision is to prevent
protagonists of special interests being represented on the supervisory
board. 17
Third, the proposed United Kingdom Companies BillI 8 states in Clause
46(1):
The matters to which the directors of a company are to have regard
in the performance of their functions shall include the interests of the
company's employees generally, as well as the interests of its
members.
The wording of this provision makes it clear that the directors may take
into account interests other than those of the employees and members,
and that interest can only be the public interest.
16. BULL. OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (Supp. 4/75).
17. P. SANDERS, DUTCH COMPANY LAW 189 (1977).
18. WHITE PAPER ON CHANGES IN COMPANY LAW, CMND. No. 7291 (1978).
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The public interest, however, is served also by other provisions of
modern company law. The publicity requirements of various countries
go far beyond the need to convey information to the shareholders.
French company law requires the publication of a social report' 9 and
the publicity requirements of the United Kingdom Companies Acts
1948-1976 demand the disclosure of many items which can only be jus-
tified in the public interest, such as the number of employees and their
average remuneration, a general disclosure of the remuneration of the
directors and leading employees, a disclosure of the turnover and ex-
port performance, and so on.
This tendency may make itself felt more strongly in future years.
It is likely that if the division and the function of the management in a
policy board and managing board is generally recognized, representa-
tives of the public interest, including consumers, will find a seat as di-
rectors on the policy board.
Conclusion
At the end the question may be asked, will the company survive as
a form of business organization? Will it continue to exist in the new
structure of economy into which we are moving? If the analysis at-
tempted at the beginning of this essay is correct, and we move indeed
into an era of regulated capitalism, the private sector of industry will be
fully maintained although under the auspices of social responsibility
and regulation by the state. As long as we shall have a sector of private
business, the company will survive, but its philosophy and aims as well
as its structure and organization will change in response to social needs.
19. Le Gall, The Social Report in French Law, 1978 J. Bus. L. 394.
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